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This paper treats programs in which firms voluntarily agree to meet environmental standards as “green
clubs”: clubs, because they provide non-rival but excludable reputation benefits to participating firms;
green, because they also generate environmental public goods. The model illuminates a central tension
between the congestion externality familiar from conventional club theory and the free-riding externality
familiar from the theory on private provision of public goods. We compare three common program
sponsors—governments, industry, and environmental groups. We find that if monitoring of the club
standard is perfect, a government constrained from regulating club size may prefer to leave sponsorship
to industry if public-good benefits are sufficiently low, or to environmentalists if public-good benefits
are sufficiently high. If monitoring is imperfect, an important question is whether consumers can infer
that a club is too large for its standard to be credible. If they can, then the government may deliberately
choose an imperfect monitoring mechanism as a way of regulating club size indirectly. If they cannot,
then this reinforces the government’s preference for delegating sponsorship.
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Eco-certication programs|programs in which rms volunteer to meet environmental per-
formance standards in return for the right to display an eco-label or logo on their products or
advertising materials|are by now a well-established part of the environmental-policy toolkit,
and are widely viewed as potentially useful substitutes for, or complements to, mandatory
environmental regulation.
1 B orkey et al. (1999) count over 50 programs in the U.S., over
300 in the European Union, and over 30,000 (mostly local ones) in Japan. In a more recent
survey, Carmin et al. (2003) count as many as 150 U.S. programs. Government-sponsored
programs include the Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse Gases Program of the Department
of Energy (DOE) and the Energy Star program of the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and DOE jointly. Industry-sponsored programs include the Encouraging Environ-
mental Excellence (E3) program of the American Textile Manufacturers Institute and the
Sustainable Forestry Initiative of the American Forestry and Paper Association. Programs
sponsored by third-party Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) include the Cooperative
Sanctuary Program (for golf courses) of the Audubon Society and the Alliance for Environ-
mental Innovation program of the Environmental Defense Fund.
2
Concurrent with this development, a large literature has emerged to analyze these pro-
grams, both theoretically and empirically.
3 Focusing here on the theoretical literature, a cen-
tral question is why rms might voluntarily commit to exceed regulatory requirements. Sug-
gested benets include pre-emption of potentially more onerous future regulations (Segerson
and Miceli, 1998; Lyon and Maxwell, 2003), higher prices oered by \green consumers"
(Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995; Kotchen, 2006; Besley and Ghatak, 2007), reduced shirk-
ing by more motivated \green employees" (Brekke and Nyborg, 2008), and lower nancing
costs required by \green investors" (Gra Zivin and Small, 2005; Baron, 2007). Other issues
1 Tietenberg (1998) characterizes eco-certication programs as being part of the \third wave" of
information-based pollution control policies, after legal regulation (the rst wave) and market-based
instruments (the second wave).
2 There are also programs that operate world-wide, such as the Finance Initiative of the United Nations
Environment Programme, the Sustainable Development Framework of the International Council on Min-
ing & Metals (an industry association), and the ISO 14001 program of the International Organization
for Standardization (a Geneva-based NGO).
3 For excellent reviews, see Khanna (2001), Koehler (2007), and Lyon and Maxwell (2008).
1that have been examined are the diculty of monitoring and verifying what the various
labels provided by programs stand for (Mason, 2006; Hamilton and Zilberman, 2006), and
potential perverse eects of eco-labeling (Mattoo and Singh, 1994; Dosi and Moretto, 2001;
Rodriguez-Ibeas, 2007).
Except for informal discussions by B orkey et al. (1999) and some empirical analysis by
Carmin et al. (2003), however, the literature has to our knowledge never examined the
potential implications of the fact|evident from the examples above|that program sponsors
tend to fall into three groups: government agencies, industry associations, and third-party
NGOs (usually environmental groups).
4 Our aim in this paper is to tease out some of these
implications, using a very simple theoretical model.
5 We thereby draw on an important
insight from the political science literature on environmental governance, namely Prakash's
(2000) observation that the economic theory of clubs can be brought to bear on voluntary
environmental programs.
6
In their reviews of club theory, Sandler and Tschirhart (1980, 1997) dene a club as \a
voluntary group deriving mutual benet from sharing one or more of the following: produc-
tion costs, the members' characteristics, or a good characterized by excludable benets." To
see the parallel with eco-certication programs, consider the example of a forest certication
program that promotes sustainable forest practices. The program establishes a benchmark
of best practices, and if a rm volunteers to satisfy the benchmark (become a club member),
it may seek certication and thereby the right to display the program's eco-label on its prod-
ucts or advertising materials. This comes at a cost (the membership fee), but also confers
4 B orkey et al. (1999) also discuss a fourth program category, \negotiated agreements" between government
and industry. Such agreements, common particularly in the Netherlands and Japan, can be viewed as a
hybrid between government- and industry-sponsored programs.
5 A closely related model is that by Heyes and Maxwell (2004), which compares NGO sponsorship of a
voluntary eco-certication program with a mandatory standard set by a world environmental organiza-
tion (WEO). Heyes and Maxwell too assume that the NGO maximizes environmental quality while the
WEO|essentially a world-government agency|maximizes social welfare subject to political constraints.
Moreover, they note that if the WEO were fully captured by industry interests, it might instead maxi-
mize aggregate producer surplus or the interests of the median rm. They do not, however, consider the
possibility of WEO or industry sponsorship of voluntary eco-certication programs.
6 Prakash and co-author Potoski have since elaborated on this observation in a series of publications
(e.g., Potoski and Prakash, 2005; Prakash and Potoski, 2006, 2007) but have never developed it formally
within an economic framework. In an edited volume by these same authors targeted at a political-science
audience (Potoski and Prakash, 2009), we contribute a chapter (Kotchen and van 't Veld, 2009) in which
we sketch out some of the ideas that we develop formally and expand upon here.
2a \goodwill" or branding benet on the rm (the non-rival but excludable good shared by
club members); specically, if consumers know about and trust the certication program,
they may be willing to pay a premium for products that bear the program's logo.
Note also that consumers are more likely to know about a program when more rms
participate in it. The per-rm cost of promoting the program's logo therefore likely declines
with program size, as of course does each rm's share of any xed program costs. Other
program costs, however, such as those of overhead, negotiation, certication, and monitor-
ing, may well eventually increase with program size, even on a per-rm basis.
7 Additionally,
per-consumer benets from buying the green product (and thereby the premium that con-
sumers are willing to pay) may decline in program size for reasons such as lower \eco-snob"
appeal of widely available green products, or lower perceived impact of their purchase on the
environment.
8 These features parallel two further standard characteristics of a club, namely
initial economies of scale in production of the club good|which provide the rationale for
creating the club|but eventual \congestion" or \crowding" that diminishes net benets per
member.
To emphasize these many parallels, we hereafter refer to eco-certication programs as
\green clubs." Not surprisingly, what Sandler and Tschirhart (1997) term the two \basic
premises" of club theory turn out to play a central role in our analysis as well. First,
congestion brings with it a need to restrict the size of the club. Second, the \membership
7 On higher negotiation costs, see Glachant (1999), as well as Mazurek's (2002) survey of the U.S. EPA's
Project XL. On higher costs of monitoring due to greater incentives to free-ride, see Purchase (2004) as
well as the studies by Delmas and Keller (2005) and Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2007) of, respectively,
the U.S. EPA's WasteWise Program and the U.S. DOE's Climate Challenge Program. Note also that
many programs hire outside certiers; if those certiers are heterogeneous, the program faces an upward-
sloping supply curve of certication inputs. Another possible reason why larger programs may face higher
per-rm costs is increased complexity of their performance standards: a small program, for example, could
limit costs by certifying only rms that use a specic green technology (e.g., liquid silicon as an alternative
to PERC in dry cleaning), whereas a larger program may have to evaluate and monitor many dierent
technologies (e.g., wet cleaning, liquid CO2, hydrocarbons), each with environmental pros and cons.
8 On eco-snobbery, see Maynard (2007) and Barringer (2008). On the eect of perceived impact on
voluntary provision of public goods, see Duncan (2004), Owen et al. (2008) and more indirectly Andreoni
(2007). Another possible reason why large programs may generate lower per-consumer benets is that
smaller programs may be able to provide \side" benets that larger programs cannot. A small organic
label, for example, may provide consumers with not just perceived benets from consuming organic
products, but also satisfaction or \warm glow" from knowing that the good is locally grown, by farmers
perhaps known personally to the consumer.
3condition" determining the optimal club size is interdependent with the \provision condition"
determining the optimal supply of the shared good|in our case, the optimal strictness of
the club's environmental performance standard.
Sandler and Tschirhart note also that the importance of institutional structure has been a
central theme in club theory, as has the related question of what objective function to apply
in deriving the optimal membership and provision conditions. Some studies, including the
seminal one by Buchanan (1965), adopt what has since become known as the \within-club"
viewpoint, which considers only the utility of the average club member; others adopt the
\total-economy" viewpoint, which also takes into account the utility of non-members. In
our context, the within-club viewpoint seems natural when considering industry-sponsored
green clubs, while the total-economy viewpoint is more natural when considering government-
sponsored ones.
There is, however, one key feature that dierentiates green clubs from those convention-
ally studied in club theory: in addition to providing their members with the club good
of a reputational benet, green clubs also generate environmental benets. Forest certi-
cation programs, for example, aim to preserve habitat and thereby protect biodiversity;
energy-eciency programs aim to reduce emissions and other harms associated with energy
production and use. Moreover, these environmental benets are a public good: they accrue
to individuals regardless of whether they purchase program-certied products.
Incorporating this additional feature signicantly alters both the provision and member-
ship conditions for government-sponsored clubs. In particular, in addition to the congestion
externality familiar from conventional club theory, the external environmental benet gen-
erated by the club gives rise to a free-riding externality familiar from the theory on private
provision of public goods.
9 Moreover, these externalities pull in opposite directions, implying
that if the public environmental benet is suciently large, government sponsors may wish
to actively encourage rather than restrict entry into the club. A further implication of the
environmental benet is that a third, \public" viewpoint becomes relevant, namely one that
9 Cornes and Sandler (1996) review both theories. See Kotchen (2005, 2006) for applications of the theory
on private provision of public goods to green markets.
4emphasizes the public benet over any private ones generated by the club. This viewpoint
seems most natural when considering green clubs sponsored by environmental groups.
A nal issue studied in club theory that also plays a central role in our analysis concerns
the exclusion mechanism used by the club to limit its size. Sandler and Tschirhart note
that in some club-theory applications, the exclusion mechanism takes the form of a toll or
congestion price, in which case the further question arises whether the club is self-nancing,
i.e., can cover its expenses of providing the club good through the optimal toll. In the case of
green clubs, industry- and environmentalist-sponsored clubs in practice neither subsidize nor
tax club membership, in the sense of charging fees signicantly below or above those required
to cover the club's expenses. Any exclusion of members must therefore be direct, taking the
form of simply refusing to accept more rms once the desired club size has been reached.
Whether doing so is feasible for industry sponsors, however, will depend on the strictness
of antitrust law, or on whether governments can be persuaded to provide exemptions to
such law.
10 As for government sponsors, it seems clear that legal requirements of \equal
treatment" preclude these from directly regulating club size, through either prohibiting or
mandating rm entry. Moreover, if the very reason for establishing a \voluntary" club
is to provide an alternative to government regulation, then government sponsors may be
constrained from regulating club size even indirectly, through taxes or subsidies.
11 In such
cases, the government's role is limited to establishing a voluntary standard that all rms in
an industry are invited to meet.
12
10 Vedder (2001) provides an in-depth discussion of this issue and mentions several cases where the Dutch
Competition authority waived antitrust restrictions on voluntary industry agreements, arguing that the
environmental benets of these agreements were suciently large to outweigh any anticompetitive eects.
11 As noted by Carmin et al. (2003), voluntary environmental programs \emerged as an alternative means
for improving environmental conditions outside the regulatory development process" (emphasis added).
Similarly, Lyon and Maxwell (2003), citing a report by the US EPA (EPA, 2001), point out that gov-
ernment agencies often promote voluntary environmental agreements precisely because they lack the
statutory authority to establish a mandatory program. Alternatively, even if they have such authority,
they may promote the agreements to avoid high transaction costs of mandatory regulations.
12 A case in point is the Energy Star program, which was established under the 1992 Energy Policy Act,
but signicantly expanded in scope under the Clinton administration's 1993 Climate Change Action Plan
after attempts to introduce a BTU tax had failed. The program allows any manufacturer of a wide range
of products to display the Energy Star logo on its products or advertising materials, as long as the product
meets specic energy-eciency standards. Importantly, our analysis does not apply to programs where
the government does not even set a specic environmental standard, but merely encourages participating
rms to set their own environmental-performance goals, in exchange for technical assistance and perhaps
5After laying out the model in the next section and solving for the socially optimal club
conguration in Section 3, we consider in Section 4 what club size emerges under open access.
Sections 5, 6, and 7 then examine the club congurations that emerge under government,
environmentalist, and industry sponsorship, respectively, and how each compares to the so-
cially optimal conguration. Section 8 extends the model to allow for imperfect enforcement
of the club standard. Section 9 concludes.
2. Model Setup
Consider an industry with N identical rms, each of which is capable of producing one unit
of a particular consumption good, using either a conventional production technology or a
\green" technology that has a higher level of environmental friendliness. Let   0 denote a
rm's chosen level of green production, where  = 0 corresponds to conventional production.
Green production is assumed to be more costly: each rm's cost of producing a unit of
output is d+, where d is the unit cost of conventional or \dirty" production and  is the
additional marginal cost of green production.
Demand for the industry's output comes from N identical consumers, each of whom
purchases one unit of the good and has preferences of the form
U() = b + f() + g():
The utility function has three components, which we treat as additively separable for sim-
plicity: b is the consumer's private benet from consuming the conventionally produced
good; f() is the additional private benet from green consumption, such as warm glow or
improved health; and g() is the public-good benet derived from the aggregate green con-
sumption  of all consumers combined. The parameter   0 is a shift parameter, capturing
the relative importance of the public benets of green consumption. Both f() and g() are
assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly concave, with f(0) = g(0) = 0 and f0(0) > .
To simplify the exposition, we assume that b = d, so that the conventionally produced good
some favorable publicity. See Lyon and Maxwell (2007) for a review of such programs, examples of which
include the U.S. EPA's 33/50 program and the U.S. DOE's Motor Challenge program.
6yields no surplus and must be priced at cost d. The green good is priced at d + p, so that p
denotes the price premium that it fetches over the conventional good.
We assume that green production is not observable to consumers, and that it is not
credible for producers to claim green production at any level unless they are certied by
a green club.13 It follows that, without a club, producers would never engage in green
production (i.e., they would always choose  = 0), as they would be unable to charge a price
premium to cover their additional cost of  > 0.
We consider the case of a single green club that requires its members to meet a benchmark
standard of . We assume initially, though relax this assumption later, that the club can
perfectly monitor and enforce its standard. The club thus provides a mechanism that makes
its members' green production at level  fully credible to consumers. There are, however,
costs C(n) associated with managing the club, which increase in the number of member
rms n.14 Included in C(n) are xed costs of establishing the club standard, as well as
variable costs of promoting the club logo and of certifying and monitoring club members.
We assume these costs are shared equally among members, so that each member's cost share
c(n) = C(n)=n can be thought of as the club's membership fee.15
As noted in the introduction, the net benets that green clubs provide may for a variety of
reasons eventually decrease with club size, implying that congestion becomes an issue. Some
of these reasons have to do with higher per-rm club costs, others with lower per-consumer
club benets. Purely for expositional reasons, we represent congestion in our model as if
it arises only on the cost side, by assuming that average club costs initially decline in n
because of economies of scale but eventually increase in n. That is, we assume that c(n) is
U-shaped, reaching an interior minimum at a club size denoted  n. Importantly, however,
nothing of substance would change in our analysis if we instead (or in addition) assumed
13 Our setup of consumer preferences and producer costs is similar to that in Besley and Ghatak's (2007)
model of corporate social responsibility. Besley and Ghatak, however, treat green goods as experience
goods rather than credence goods, implying that consumers can monitor each rm's  directly (albeit
possibly imperfectly) and do not need certifying organizations.
14 To avoid integer problems, we treat n as continuous, and therefore the output produced by a single rm
or consumed by a single consumer as innitesimal.
15 Note that, by considering only a single club, we are implicitly assuming that c(n) is large relative to the
available surplus f()   , leaving no \room" for additional clubs.
7that congestion arises on the benet rather than the cost side. That is, we could equally
well assume average club costs to be an L-shaped (convex and declining) function `(n) of
club size, but write average consumer benets from the green good as f() j(n), with j(n)
a J-shaped (convex and eventually increasing) function. The loss of net club benets with
increasing club size would then equal `(n) + j(n), and would under weak assumptions still
be U-shaped.
Note that, by our assumptions that each rm is capable of producing only one unit of the
green good and that consumers buy at most one unit, a club with n members can supply
only n consumers. Note also that, by our assumption that the club sets a single standard
for all its members, the level of the public good it provides is  = n.
3. Social Planner
We begin by deriving the socially optimal club standard and size. Let W denote social
welfare, equal to
W = n[f()      c(n)] + Ng(n): (1)
The rst term in brackets represents the net private benet from the club, equal to n times
the additional private benet f() that each green consumer enjoys, less the additional
production costs  and club-management costs c(n) that each green producer incurs. The
second term represents the public benet from the club, enjoyed by all N consumers.
The rst-order conditions characterizing an interior maximum of W with respect to  and
n (termed the \provision" and \membership" conditions in conventional club theory) are
f
0() + Ng
0(n) =  (2)
and
f() + Ng
0(n) =  + c(n) + nc
0(n): (3)
Condition (2) equates the marginal benets|both private and public|of green consumption
to the marginal costs of green production. Condition (3) equates the marginal benets and
costs of increasing the club size. The latter costs include the change c(n)+nc0(n) in total club
8costs that results from an additional member joining. The two conditions combined implicitly
dene the socially optimal standard and club size as functions of the model parameters ,
, and N.
Ignoring the dependence on  and dening B  N, we can write the solution to the
social planner's problem as (s(B);ns(B)).16 The parameter B is useful because it captures
the weight of the public-good benet in the welfare function, which depends on the number
of consumers in the economy and those consumers' preferences for the public good.17 It is
straightforward to show that the socially optimal club standard and size are both increasing




We now consider what club size n emerges under open access to the club. We do so initially
without specifying how  is determined, but then consider in particular the socially optimal
standard s. This allows us to highlight some of the tensions at play in our subsequent
analysis of dierent institutional arrangements.
Whether rms join the club and consumers purchase the certied good depends on the
standard  and the good's price premium p over the conventionally produced good. Firms
have an incentive to join the club as long as p  +c(n), while consumers have an incentive
to purchase the certied good as long as f()  p. Note that the public-good benet does
not factor into the consumers' willingness to pay, because the public good can be enjoyed
16 A sucient condition for the welfare maximum to be interior is that over some discrete interval (;) of
 values, the private benets of green consumption net of production costs strictly exceed the club costs
at  n: that is, f()   c( n) > 0. Hereafter, we assume this to be the case. Condition (3) then implies
that ns >  n.
17 Note however that, although the B components N and  enter the welfare function in the same way,
the special case where B = 0|implying that green production generates only private benets|can only
arise if  = 0.













where the determinant of the Hessian jHj = nf00Ng002   (nf00 + Ng00n2)(2c0 + nc00) > 0.
9even without purchasing the club-certied good; those who do not purchase the green good
simply free-ride on the public-good provision by others.19 For a given standard , the club
will expand until both inequalities bind, so that
f()      c(n) = 0: (4)
No further expansion is then feasible, as the surplus f()    available to cover club costs
has been dissipated.
Equation (4) implicitly denes a function ^ n() that maps any given club standard to the






is strictly concave, and has an interior maximum where f0() = . The function is shown in
Figure 1, the other parts of which we will return to shortly. Note that the open-access club
size is not monotonic in the standard; in general, two dierent standards give rise to green
clubs of the same size. This follows simply because the surplus f()    available to cover
given club costs is inversely U-shaped in the standard.
Consider now the club size ^ n(s) that emerges under open access if the club standard
is set at the socially optimal level for a given value of B, and consider how it compares to
the socially optimal club size ns. The socially optimal club size is determined by equation
(3), which has two additional terms that do not appear in equation (4). These terms reect
the social marginal benet of an increase in club size from higher provision of the public
good, Bg0(n), and the social marginal cost from higher club administration costs, nc0(n).
Corresponding to these terms are two externalities that arise under open access, which have
opposite eects on the equilibrium club size. Specically, Bg0(n) corresponds to the stan-
dard public-good externality from the theory on private provision of public goods: consumers'
19 Recall from footnote 14 that any single consumer's purchase of the green good is innitesimal, and
therefore has a negligible eect on the overall level of the public good.
20 Strictly speaking, ^ n() is a correspondence rather than a function, because for given , condition (4)
holds at two values of n: one where average club costs are declining (n <  n) and one where they are
increasing (n >  n). We ignore the former value, because under open access it does not represent a stable
equilibrium: any accidental entry at n <  n will reduce average club costs and thus make club surplus|
the left-hand side of (4)|positive. This will then attract further entry until n >  n. Note also that the
function is dened only on the interval [;], where f()      c( n) = f()      c( n) = 0.







Figure 1. Locus of open-access equilibrium club sizes ^ n() given dierent stan-
dards , and locus of socially optimal standards and club sizes (s(B);ns(B)) given
dierent weights B on public-good benets.
free-riding on such provision through other consumers' purchases creates a tendency for the
open-access club to be suboptimally small. On the other hand, nc0(n) corresponds to the
standard congestion externality from club theory: rms' ignoring the increase in club man-
agement costs imposed on other rms when they join the club creates a tendency for the
club to be suboptimally large.
This suggests the interesting possibility that the two externalities may exactly oset each
other at the socially optimal standard, in which case open access will give rise to the socially
optimal club size. It turns out that this condition does in fact hold at a particular value Bc
of the weight placed on the public-good benets.21
Figure 1 illustrates this special case and shows more generally when open access will
result in a club that is suboptimally small or large. As mentioned previously, the inversely
U-shaped curve represents the open-access equilibrium condition. The curve traces out the
21 This follows because at weight B = 0 and standard s(0), the open-access club size is ^ n(s(0)) >  n.
The congestion externality is therefore positive, while the public-good externality is zero. But since
s(B) is easily shown to be unbounded from above, there must exist some weight B such that s(B = ,
resulting in open-access club size ^ n(s(B)) =  n. The public-good externality is then positive, while the
congestion externality is zero. By continuity, there must then also exist a weight Bc 2 (0;B) where the
two externalities are equal at open-access club size ^ n(s(Bc)).
11locus of (;n) combinations at which per-rm net private benets are zero (hereafter, we
drop the qualier \net" as understood). Everywhere inside the curve, these benets are
positive, while everywhere outside, they are negative. The upward-sloping curve traces out
the locus of (;n) combinations that are socially optimal at dierent values of B. Recall
that both the socially optimal standard s and the socially optimal club size ns increase
in B, so that the bottom-left point (s(0);ns(0)) of the locus is the social optimum with
no public benets at all. Equivalently, this is the point where total private benets|the
rst component of the welfare function|are maximized. The point where the two curves
intersect implicitly denes the critical weight Bc referred to above.
If the club standard is set at the socially optimal value s given B = Bc, then the club size
that emerges under open access, ^ n(s), is the socially optimal size ns. In eect, consumers'
free-riding is exactly oset by rms' ignoring congestion costs. If B < Bc, however, public-
good benets are relatively small, so that the congestion externality dominates and open
access results in a club that is too large. Alternatively, if B > Bc, public-good benets are
relatively large, so that the public-good externality dominates and open access results in a
club that is too small.
5. Government Clubs
The rst institutional arrangement we examine is a government-sponsored club, which we
assume aims to maximize social welfare (i.e., adopts the \total-economy" viewpoint of club
theory). As discussed in the introduction, a government sponsor cannot in practice regulate
club size directly, by either prohibiting or mandating rm entry. Whether it can regulate club
size indirectly, through taxes or subsidies, will depend on the political environment. If the
government's main rationale for promoting a voluntary club is that it lacks political support
for a mandatory program, then the club may be limited to setting a voluntary standard that
all rms are invited to meet.22
22 Importantly, even if political constraints prevent the government from taxing or subsidizing club mem-
bers overtly, it may be still be able to \disguise" such incentives, for example by charging above-cost
certication fees or oering free publicity of members' compliance.
12If the government is able to use incentives, one incentive it might use is an admission
fee  over and above the average club administration costs c(n). Since this fee acts as
an additional cost for rms, which all else equal reduces their incentive to join the club,
equilibrium condition (4) then becomes
f() =  + c(n) + : (6)
Comparing this with rst-order condition (3) shows that the government can implement the










In eect, the admission fee forces entering rms to internalize the net eect of both ex-
ternalities associated with membership. Note that s may be either positive or negative,
depending on whether the congestion externality or the public-good externality dominates.
In the latter case, the optimal policy would be to subsidize club membership, in order to
promote more public-good provision.
An equivalent mechanism to the admission fee would be a tax  on the green good. Such
a tax drives a wedge between the premium pc paid by consumers, and the premium pf
received by rms, such that pc = pf + , and club entry would continue until f()   pc = 0
and pf      c(n) = 0. Combining these three conditions yields the same equilibrium
condition (6). Hence setting the tax  as in equation (7) would again implement the socially
optimal club, and again the tax could be negative, implying a subsidy on the green good.
If the government is not able to impose any taxes or subsidies, its only instrument is the
club standard, with the club size determined under open access. Hereafter, we refer to this
as the \constrained government" case. How, if at all, this constraint aects the club outcome
turns out to depend crucially on the degree to which the green good provides any public-
good benets, as parameterized by B. To see this, note that the constrained government's
optimization problem can be written as
max
;n
W = n[f()      c(n)] + Bg(n) s.t. f()      c(n) = 0; (8)
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Figure 2. Optimum (g;ng) for a government club if regulating club size is not
feasible, (e;ne) for an environmentalist club, and (i;ni) for an industry club.
which is equivalent to
max

W = Bg(^ n()): (9)
Clearly, in the extreme case where the green good provides only private benets (i.e., B = 0),
the sponsor will be indierent between all feasible club standards, and even indierent about
establishing a club in the rst place. The reason is simply that, under open access, all private
benets from the club are dissipated. As a result, the open-access club makes no contribution
to social welfare, at any standard.
The dissipation of private benets also implies that if the green good does provide public-
good benets (i.e., B > 0), then the sponsor will choose  so as to maximize those benets
alone. Moreover, since the parameter B enters the objective function in (9) as a multiplicative
constant, the solution must be independent of its value. That is, regardless of how important
public-good benets are, the government sponsor will choose the same standard g, resulting
in the same open-access club size ng = ^ n(g).
Figure 2 illustrates the government's optimization problem by adding level curves repre-
senting combinations of  and n that yield the same level of public-good spillovers n. The
government chooses the highest level curve subject to the open-access constraint represented
14by the ^ n() curve, and because neither these level curves nor the constraint depend on B,
the solution is always the same point (g;ng).
The gure shows also that this solution lies exactly at the crossing point of the locus
of social optima with the open-access constraint, i.e., at the critical point (s(Bc);ns(Bc))
discussed in the previous section. To see why this must be the case, recall that Bc is the
critical weight on public-good benets where, if the standard is set at the socially optimal
value s(Bc), open access gives rise to the socially optimal club size. Mathematically, this
implies that at Bc, the combination (s(Bc);ns(Bc)) must solve problem (8), and must
therefore coincide with the government's solution at any B. More generally, we can see that
the government's solution is socially optimal only at Bc, and the constant standard g and
club size ng are both suboptimally low (high) if B > (<)Bc.
Summarizing, we nd the following:23
Proposition 1. If the government can regulate club size indirectly through a tax or subsidy
on club membership or the green good, then it can implement the socially optimal club. If it
cannot regulate club size, then it will be indierent between sponsoring a club or not having
one at all if B = 0. If B > 0, however, the government prefers establishing a club and
always chooses the same standard, which results in the same club size. The government club
is socially optimal if B = Bc, but yields a too low (high) standard and club size if B > (<)Bc.
6. Environmentalist Clubs
We now consider the alternative of an environmental group that establishes a club to certify
a particular good as green, with the explicit objective of maximizing  = n, the level of
the environmental public good.24 In principle, the group may be able to choose not just the
club characteristics (;n), but also the premium p charged for the club-certied good. In
23 Full proofs of all propositions are available upon request.
24 Strictly speaking, since environmentalists are part of society, their preferences should be incorporated
in the welfare function. This could be done, for example, by writing the public-good component of
welfare as (N +M)g(n), with M the number of environmentalists, and then dening B  (N +M).
Qualitatively, much of our analysis would go through unchanged if we assumed that environmentalists
derive utility from consuming the green good as well, but merely place a greater relative weight on utility
from the public good.
15doing so, however, it is constrained by the requirements that consumers must be willing to
buy the green good, so that p cannot exceed their willingness to pay f(), and that rms
must be willing to join the club, so that p must cover their average production and club
costs () + c(n).25
At any solution to the club's problem, both constraints must bind. This implies that the
optimal premium and club size, conditional on the standard, are precisely those that result
from open-access entry of rms to the club, as analyzed in Section 4. The club's optimization
problem can therefore be written as
max
;n




E = ^ n(): (11)
Since B does not enter the club's objective function, the solution (e;ne) is identical at any
B > 0.26 Moreover, just as we found was true of the government club's solution, the environ-
mentalist club's solution coincides with the social optimum at critical weight Bc. Underlying
this is again the fact that open access fully dissipates the club's net private benets, leaving
only the public benets Bg(n). But since those benets increase monotonically in the level
n of the public good, the environmentalist club's problem of maximizing the latter along
the ^ n() curve must yield the same solution as the social planner's problem at Bc.
Proposition 2. If an environmentalist group sponsors the club, then it chooses the same
standard at all B > 0, resulting in the same club size. The environmentalist club is socially
optimal at Bc, but yields a too low (high) standard and club size at B > (<)Bc.
Combining Propositions 1 and 2 yields the following additional result:
Proposition 3. If an environmentalist group sponsors the club, then its optimum at all
B > 0 coincides with that of a government constrained from regulating club size.
25 We assume that the environmental group neither subsidizes the club with outside funds nor taxes the
club to generate such funds.
26 Mathematically, the solution applies even at B = 0, but it is implausible that an environmentalist group
would want to maximize public-good provision if consumers placed zero weight on the resulting benets.
16This latter result suggests an alternative policy option available to the constrained gov-
ernment: instead of creating and administering the club itself, it can simply encourage an
environmentalist group to do so. In fact, if direct government sponsorship of a club gives
rise to any transaction or political costs that a non-government sponsor can avoid, then this
alternative option will be strictly preferable.
7. Industry Clubs
Industry-sponsored clubs are focused on the prots of their members. We assume an industry
club will want to expand its membership only if doing so increases the prots of existing
members. Equivalently, its objective is to maximize average club prots (corresponding to
the \within-club" viewpoint of club theory).
A key question is whether the industry club can in practice restrict its membership without
falling afoul of antitrust laws. It seems reasonable to assume that it cannot, but then, under
the baseline assumptions of our model, the industry solution becomes trivial: since open
access dissipates all prots, no industry has an incentive to create a green club.
It turns out, moreover, that under certain circumstances a constrained government may
be inclined to waive antitrust restrictions, in order to provide an industry with the incentive




 = p      c(n); s.t. f()  p;
where the constraint requires that consumers must be willing to pay the price premium for
the green good. Since the club has no reason to leave the consumer with any surplus, this




 = f()      c(n);
with rst-order (provision and membership) conditions
f
0() =  (12)
17c
0(n) = 0: (13)
Condition (12) shows that the industry club will choose the socially optimal standard s(0)
that would apply if the green good provided only private benets. Intuitively, this standard
maximizes those benets given any club size. Condition (13) shows that the club will at
the same time choose the most ecient club size in terms of minimizing per-member club
management costs, namely  n.
Note that, because public-good spillovers have no eect on consumers' willingness to pay
for the green good, and therefore no eect on rm prots, the solution is again independent
of B. In eect, the industry club is the polar opposite of the environmentalist club; whereas
the latter focuses solely on public-good benets, the industry club focuses solely on private
benets.
Nevertheless, because the industry club maximizes average rather than total private ben-
ets, its solution (i;ni) = (s(0);  n) is never socially optimal, even when B = 0. This is
because the industry club has no reason expand the club beyond  n, given that doing so
increases average club costs and thereby reduces existing members' prots. In contrast, ex-
panding the club increases welfare as long as the increase in overall club costs, nc0(n), falls
short of the social benet that an additional member generates, f()      c(n). Since
c0( n) = 0 and f()  c( n) > 0 at s(0), the socially optimal club size ns(0) must exceed
 n.
Proposition 4. If industry sponsors the club and is able to restrict the club size, then it
chooses standard s(0), which equals (is less than) the social optimum at B = (>) 0, and it
chooses club size  n, which is lower than the social optimum at any B.
As with the environmentalist-club solution, it is again of interest to compare the industry-
club solution to that of a constrained government. Key to this comparison is that, whereas
all private benets are dissipated at the government's solution, the industry solution has
strictly positive private benets. As a result, when B = 0, so that private benets are all
that matters to the government, it strictly prefers the industry solution. When B = Bc, on
the other hand, welfare is strictly higher at the government's own solution, since that solution
18then coincides with the social optimum. By continuity, there must be an intermediate weight
^ B 2 (0;Bc) at which both solutions yield the same welfare. It can be shown, moreover, that
welfare increases more rapidly with B when evaluated at the government solution than when
evaluated at the industry solution.27 It follows that the industry-club solution dominates at
all B < ^ B, but the government's own solution dominates at all B > ^ B.
Combined with our earlier result that the constrained government solution coincides with
the environmentalist-club solution, this result implies that the conclusion at the end of the
previous section must be amended:
Proposition 5. A constrained government is indierent between sponsoring its own club
and encouraging an environmentalist club only if B exceeds a critical value ^ B 2 (0;Bc). At
lower B values, it instead strictly prefers encouraging an industry-sponsored club over either
alternative.
Intuitively, encouraging an industry-sponsored club allows the government to indirectly
restrict club size and thereby minimize private-benet dissipation. Even though the industry
club will \undershoot" by restricting club size further than is socially optimal, the resulting
welfare loss is at low B values smaller than that from the open-access \overshoot " that
arises with the government or environmentalist clubs.
8. Monitoring and Enforcement
Up to this point, we have assumed that whereas green production is not veriable by con-
sumers, a green club can and does perfectly monitor compliance with its benchmark standard.
In practice, however, the stringency of monitoring is clearly a choice variable of the club.
Moreover, if the club chooses to monitor imperfectly, member rms may have an incentive
to produce at a lower standard, denoted ~ , to save on production costs.
To see the implications of imperfect club monitoring, consider the simplest case where (i)
the club can commit to a monitoring regime under which cheating by any given member rm
27 Letting Wg denote the former and Wi the latter, we have that @Wg=@B = g(ngg) > g( ns(0)) =
@Wi=@B, since g() is increasing and ngg = ns(Bc)s(Bc) >  ns(0).
19is detected with probability q at the beginning of each period, and any rm found cheating
is expelled from the club forever;28 (ii) the detection probability q does not depend on ~ ;
and (iii) the marginal cost of achieving detection probability q is constant, equal to m per
period, per rm.
Assumption (ii) implies that a cheating rm optimally sets ~  = 0, i.e., produces the
conventional version of the good while claiming to produce the green version. Assumption
(iii) can be captured mathematically by redening c(n) to exclude variable monitoring costs
mq, and treating the latter as an additional cost incurred by club members.29
All three assumptions combined imply a minimum premium that a rm must receive to
be deterred from cheating. To see this, let   1=(1 + r) denote a rm's discount factor.
Now compare the present value of its innite stream of rents if it always complies with the
club standard,
V0  [p      c(n)   mq] + V0 =
p      c(n)   mq
1   
; (14)
with the present value of its expected stream of rents if it cheats for just one period, but
then reverts to complying with the standard,30
V1  (1   q)[p   c(n)   mq + V0]: (15)
The standard \one-stage-deviation principle" of multi-stage games (see Fudenberg and Ti-
role, 1991) implies that a rm is deterred from cheating any number of times if it is deterred
from cheating just once, i.e., if V0  V1. Substituting from (14) and (15) and recognizing
that any equilibrium will have f() = p yields the equivalent inequality
f()      c(n)   mq 
(1   )(1   q)
q
  x(q;): (16)
28 If there are any costs associated with monitoring or expelling rms, the club must be able to commit to
the regime ex ante. This is because the sponsor otherwise has an incentive to monitor less intensely ex
post if all rms are induced to comply, or to renegotiate punishment ex post if a rm is caught cheating.
For discussion of how such commitment may be achieved in practice (for example by delegating actual
implementation of the monitoring regime to an outside auditor), see Melumad and Mookherjee (1989).
Importantly, as pointed out by Lenox and Nash (2003), expulsion may be the only punishment available
to voluntary programs, since members can simply leave the program to avoid other forms of punishment.
29 Note that c(n) could still include xed monitoring costs, i.e., costs that do not vary with monitoring
stringency.
30 If inspections occurred at the end rather than the beginning of each period, the expression would instead
be V1 = p   c(n) + (1   q)V0. Qualitatively, our results would go through unchanged.
20That is, as long as member rms earn rents of at least x(q;) when they comply, the risk
of losing these rents forever with probability q will be sucient to deter them from cheating.
A nal assumption, which turns out to be of crucial importance to the types of equilibria
that arise with imperfect monitoring, concerns the ability of consumers to observe whether
or not rms have in fact been expelled from the club for cheating. Below, we rst consider
the case where consumers are \uninformed," in the sense that they do not observe such ex-
pulsions, and then the case where consumers are \informed." Which of these cases applies in
practice will depend on the prominence of the club's eco-label, and thereby on the likelihood
that instances of cheating will be widely publicized by the news media.
For each information case we also consider how the equilibrium changes with the marginal
monitoring cost m. We do so because, for some green products, it is reasonable to assume
that this marginal cost is close to zero, while for others it may be quite large. In particular,
if a product's claimed environmental friendless is based on design features, as with energy-
ecient buildings, low-ow toilets, or easily recyclable appliances, then verifying these claims
may require just a single inspection when the product is rst launched, whereby the marginal
cost of increasing the probability q of detecting any cheating may be quite low. In contrast, if
a product's claimed environmental friendless is based on the manner in which it is produced,
as with organically grown food, shade-grown coee, or sustainably harvested wood, then
verifying these claims likely requires repeated and involved inspections of production sites.
The probability q of detecting cheating then clearly depends on the frequency and intensity
of such inspection visits, implying that marginal costs of increasing q may be quite high.
Mathematically, the level of m aects equilibrium outcomes through its eect on the \no-
cheating constraint" (16). Evaluating this constraint at equality, we can treat it as implicitly
dening a maximum club size ^ n(;q;m) at which rms will still optimally comply with a
standard , conditional on detection probability q and monitoring cost m. If monitoring is
perfect (q = 1) and involves only xed costs (m = 0), the function ^ n(;1;0) coincides with
^ n() in the previous sections.







whereby both the denominator on the right-hand side and the  xq(q;) term in the nu-
merator are positive. This implies that when m is zero, reducing the detection probability
q has the eect of reducing the maximum feasible club size at any given standard, as illus-
trated by the curves labeled ^ n(;q = 1;0), ^ n(;qg < 1;0), and ^ n(;qi  1;0) in Figure 3.
Intuitively, reducing the detection probability increases rms' incentive to cheat, thereby
raising the minimum rents x(q;) required to deter cheating. For a given standard , with
the premium already at its upper bound p = f(), the only way to increase rents is to reduce
the number of rms in the club, thereby reducing average club costs c(n).
When m is positive, however, reducing q has the additional eect of reducing monitoring
costs, which all else equal permits an increase in average club costs c(n) consistent with
keeping rents at a given level. Equation (17) shows that at large m|large enough to make
the numerator on the right-hand side positive|this additional eect will dominate. Reducing
q will then increase the maximum feasible club size, as illustrated in Figure 4. (The dashed
line in the gure shows the eect of the monitoring-cost reduction alone, before adjusting
rents to x(q;).)
8.1. Uninformed consumers
Consider rst the case where consumers observe the club's monitoring commitment, but
do not observe any actual expulsions of cheating rms when such expulsions occur. An
immediate implication is that, unless club managers can regulate club size directly, the only
feasible club involves perfect monitoring. The reason is simply that, under open access, rms
will have no reason not to enter beyond the club size ^ n(;q;m). Doing so will cause the no-
cheating constraint to fail, but unless monitoring is perfect, so x(1;) = 0, rms' expected
rents from entering and cheating will be positive up to a larger club size.31 Anticipating
this, consumers will rationally refuse to buy from any club that commits to less-than-perfect
31 The club size at which rents are driven to zero given cheating is implicitly dened by f() c(n) mq = 0.
22monitoring, unless that club can combine this with restrictions on rm entry so as to keep
the no-cheating constraint satised.
It follows that for the constrained government and industry clubs, allowing for imperfect
monitoring essentially makes no dierence: the analysis of Sections 5 and 7 goes through
unchanged. For environmentalist clubs, the same is true provided monitoring costs are
low enough for @^ n=@q to be positive when evaluated at q = 1 and at the club's optimal
standard given perfect monitoring. This follows because, if imperfect monitoring reduces
the maximum feasible club size at that standard, it can only reduce the maximum feasible
level of public-good provision ^ n(;q;m), which can only hurt the environmentalist club. By
the same reasoning, however, if monitoring costs are large enough to make @^ n=@q negative
when evaluated at the same starting point, then switching to imperfect monitoring combined
with a restriction on entry to club size ^ n(;q;m) must benet the club.32 That is, if m is
large enough, an environmentalist club optimally monitors imperfectly. Note that it does
so not to save on monitoring costs directly|after all, such costs do not enter its objective
function. Rather, it does so because reducing monitoring costs for member rms allows
it to both expand the club and set a higher standard, thereby achieving a higher level of
public-goods provision.
This in turn has implications for optimal delegation by the government. Specically, since
rents are fully dissipated at the constrained government solution, and since the no-cheating
constraint always binds at the environmentalist solution, the dierence between welfare at











Whenever monitoring costs are high enough for the environmental group to choose imperfect
monitoring (qe < 1), the rst term on the right-hand side is strictly positive. Moreover, by
revealed preference on the part of the environmental group, nee  ngg, so that the second
term is non-negative. It follows that W e > W g.
32 Mathematically, after substituting constraint (16) into the club's objective function, the Lagrangian
associated with its optimization problem reduces to L = ^ n(;q;m) +(1 q). The rst-order condition
w.r.t. q is therefore (@^ n=@q)    = 0, which cannot hold at q = 1 if @^ n=@qjq=1 is negative.
23Proposition 6. When consumers are uninformed and monitoring is suciently costly, an
environmentalist club optimally monitors imperfectly. In all such cases, a constrained gov-
ernment strictly prefers delegating sponsorship to the environmentalist club over sponsoring
its own club.
Intuitively, if a government club would be forced to monitor perfectly at very high cost,
the government may do better \borrowing" the environmentalist club's ability to save on
monitoring costs by regulating club size directly. Similarly, the government may also do
better delegating sponsorship to an industry club, in this case after endowing the club with
the same ability by waiving antitrust restrictions. If the industry club is allowed to regulate
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When monitoring is costly, the rst term on the right-hand side is strictly positive, so that
W i > W g at suciently low values of B.33
Proposition 7. When consumers are uninformed and monitoring is costly, an industry club
that can regulate its size optimally monitors imperfectly. A constrained government may then
strictly prefer waiving antitrust restrictions and delegating sponsorship to an industry club
over sponsoring its own club.
8.2. Informed consumers
Consider next the case where consumers, in addition to observing the club's monitoring
commitment, do observe any expulsions of cheating rms, and assume for simplicity that
they do so instantaneously, i.e., immediately when expulsions occur.
34 This seemingly minor
change in consumer information turns out to have important implications.
The reason is that now, even under open access and even with imperfect monitoring,
rms will not enter beyond the club size ^ n(;q;m) that maintains compliance with a given
33 If m > 0, the industry club's optimization problem max;n;q  = f()      c(n)   mq subject to (16)
has solution n =  n, i < s(0), and qi < 1. The nal inequality implies that x(qi;) > 0.
34 Imperfect or delayed observation can easily be accommodated in the model, but this would signicantly
complicate the exposition.
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Figure 3. Eect of imperfect monitoring on the maximum feasible club size when
marginal monitoring costs are zero.
standard . Once the club has grown to this size, outside rms will realize that further
entry, by increasing club costs and thereby driving per-rm rents below x(q;), would
only induce all member rms to start cheating. Since consumers, as soon as they observe
the resulting rm expulsions, would stop buying from the club, entering rms would have
no hope of covering their club costs.35
None of this matters to environmentalist clubs, since open access does not concern them.
For industry and constrained government clubs, however, the situation changes signicantly.
This is because, through purposely monitoring imperfectly and thereby shrinking the open-
access constraint ^ n(;q;m) in the manner of Figure 3, these clubs now can in eect restrict
club size (without, in the case of industry clubs, falling afoul of antitrust regulations) and
thus deliver positive private rents to their members.
More specically, if marginal monitoring costs are zero, the industry club can now set its
standard optimally at i = s(0) and achieve its optimal size  n by purposely choosing the
imperfect detection probability qi such that ^ n(s(0);qi;0) =  n. If marginal monitoring costs
are positive, it can be shown that the club will optimally relax its standard somewhat in
35 A implicit assumption here is that at least some component of club costs is sunk. In reality, this is clearly
true of certication costs included in c(n) or mq.
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Figure 4. Eect of imperfect monitoring on the maximum feasible club size when
marginal monitoring costs are large.
order to save on monitoring costs, i.e., choose i < s(0), but will still set the same optimal
club size by choosing qi such that ^ n(i;qi;m) =  n.36
Similarly, if marginal monitoring costs are zero, the government club may now set its stan-
dard at the socially optimal level g = s(B) and achieve the socially optimal club size ns(B)
by purposely choosing the imperfect detection probability qg such that ^ n(s(B);qg;0) =
ns(B). Note, however, that this is possible only for welfare weights B < Bc such as b B in
Figure 3, i.e., weights at which the social optimum lies inside the open-access constraint with
perfect monitoring. For weights B  Bc, the social optimum lies on or outside this constraint,
so that shrinking it through imperfect monitoring is of no use. The best the government can
do in such cases is still to either monitor perfectly or delegate to an environmentalist club.
If marginal monitoring costs are positive, matters are complicated by the fact that, even
when the social optimum (s(B);ns(B)) with perfect monitoring lies inside the open-access
constraint with perfect monitoring, and is therefore in principle achievable, the government
club will nevertheless optimally both relax its standard and choose a smaller club size than
36 The club's optimal detection probability need not decline monotonically with m, however: it can be
shown (by example) that, because of the ambiguous eect of higher m on the no-cheating constraint, the
club may paradoxically increase its monitoring eort when monitoring costs increase.
26this social optimum, in order to save on monitoring costs. It remains true, however, that
for weights below some upper bound B, the government will optimally monitor imperfectly,
while for higher weights it will optimally either monitor perfectly or delegate.37 Moreover,
it can be shown that if variable monitoring costs are so large that even an environmentalist
club will monitor imperfectly, the upper bound B becomes innite. The government club
will then always monitor imperfectly, at any weight B, but also always prefer sponsoring its
own club over delegating sponsorship to environmentalists.
The following proposition summarizes these results:
Proposition 8. When consumers are informed, both an industry club and a government
club may deliberately choose to monitor imperfectly, even if marginal monitoring costs are
zero. For the government, imperfect monitoring is optimal if B is below an upper bound B,
which goes to innity if monitoring is suciently costly. In all such cases, the government
strictly prefers sponsoring its own club over delegating sponsorship to an environmentalist
club.
9. Conclusion
The model developed in this paper treats voluntary environmental programs as green clubs:
clubs, because they provide non-rival but excludable reputation benets to participating
rms; green, because they also generate environmental public goods. The model illuminates
a central tension between the congestion externality familiar from conventional club the-
ory and the free-riding externality familiar from the theory on private provision of public
goods. We have used this model to examine how three common types of program sponsors|
government agencies, industry associations, and environmental groups|are likely to dier
in terms of their management decisions, and how the resulting club congurations compare
to the social optimum. Our ndings have implications for optimal government delegation of
sponsorship to other groups, optimal application of antitrust restrictions to industry clubs,
37 As with the industry club, the government club's optimal detection probability qg need not decline
monotonically with m.
27optimal stringency of monitoring compliance with club standards, and optimal dissemination
of information about clubs to consumers.
Our analysis highlights three key factors that drive our results. One is the weight on
public-good benets in the social welfare function, which determines the socially optimal
club standard and size. Because the environmentalist club cares only about the public good,
its optimum is independent of this weight; as a result, the environmentalist club maximizes
welfare only if the weight happens to take on a critical value. Similarly, because the industry
club cares only about per-rm prots, its optimum is independent of the weight as well, and
turns out to never be socially optimal.
The second factor is whether the government club can regulate club size, either directly
or through taxes and subsidies. If political constraints prevent such regulation, then under
our baseline assumption of perfect monitoring, open access dissipates all private benets
from the club, leaving it to maximize public-good provision alone. This implies that the
government may be indierent about leaving club sponsorship to an environmental group if
the welfare weight on public-good benets is high. It also implies that, since private benets
are not dissipated at the industry optimum, the government may strictly prefer leaving club
sponsorship to an industry association if the welfare weight on public-good benets is low.
Doing so may require waiving antitrust restrictions, however, if these would otherwise force
the industry club to be open access as well.
The third factor plays a role only if monitoring of the club standard is potentially im-
perfect. It concerns the ability of consumers to observe whether rms have been caught
and expelled from the club for cheating. If consumers can observe expulsions, then club
rents are no longer fully dissipated under open access, and stringency of monitoring be-
comes an instrument to aect club size indirectly. Government and industry clubs may now
attain their respective optima by deliberately monitoring imperfectly, and the government
will therefore strictly prefer sponsoring its own club over leaving sponsorship to others. If
consumers cannot observe expulsions, then we are back to full rent dissipation under open
access. This leaves rms with no incentive to comply with any standard unless cheating is
detected with certainty, possibly at great cost. The government may then strictly prefer
28leaving sponsorship to others over sponsoring its own club. An obvious further implication
is that both government and industry sponsors can benet from mechanisms that inform
consumers about enforcement actions.
We believe that our model provides a useful starting point for further analysis of the
institutional arrangements of green clubs. Future work might consider dierent sources of
private benets captured by these clubs, such as avoided costs of mandatory regulations, or
dynamic benets from learning by doing. It might also consider dierent sources of club
congestion, such as free-riding by late entrants on eorts by earlier ones, or lower willingness
to pay by consumers for products of less \select" clubs. Generalizing our model to allow for
heterogeneity of consumers and/or rms would permit analysis of the quite common practice
of oering a \menu" of standards, such as the certied, silver, gold, and platinum standards
oered by the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) program.
Two particularly interesting issues that we have abstracted from are possible competi-
tion between multiple clubs in a market, as well as possibly imperfect competition between
rms. Examples of markets in which multiple clubs operate include the green-building mar-
ket, where the industry-sponsored Green Globes and National Green Building programs
compete with the NGO-sponsored LEED program, and the sustainably harvested wood
market, where the industry-sponsored Sustainable Forestry Initiative competes with the
NGO-sponsored Forest Stewardship Council. As for imperfect competition between rms,
an important strand of the eco-labeling literature (e.g., Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995;
Bagnoli and Watts, 2003; Amacher et al., 2004; Conrad, 2005; Garcia-Gallego and Geor-
gantzis, 2009) has focused on implications of such competition, while taking as given that
green rms can credibly certify whatever level of environmental performance they choose. A
richer, more realistic model might combine elements of this approach with ours, recognizing
that rms (both green and brown) may have market power, while recognizing also that green
rms often cannot self-certify, and may therefore need to join some green club.
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